The State of the Literature.
The standard contemporary analysis of knowledge runs as follows. Some subject S knows some proposition P if and only if: Knowing Without Believing, p. 4
and some philosophers would add a further condition (iv.). Dispute tends to center on how to think about condition (iii) and whether some additional condition (iv) is necessary. Conditions (i) and (ii) are often treated as largely uncontroversial.
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Proponents of condition (ii) on knowledge -that is, of the view that (propositional) knowledge entails belief -might defend their view in one of two ways. They might present a general argument that shows that knowledge entails belief, or they might challenge those who would deny that knowledge entails belief to present an intuitive counterexample to the thesisthat is, a case of knowledge without belief -and then conclude the truth of condition (ii) from the failure of any opponents of that condition to present convincing counterexamples. The primary strategy in the literature has been the latter, which we will call the wait-forcounterexamples strategy (Cohen 1966; Armstrong 1969 Armstrong , 1973 Sorenson 1982; Dartnall 1986; Steup 2001 Steup /2006 3 ). It is a feature of this strategy that it turns on judgments about the correct classification of hypothetical scenarios as cases of knowledge or belief: There must be no case that is intuitively, or properly, or in the judgment of a well-informed philosopher (here, it seems to us, the methodological assumptions and standards of success become a bit hazy), both a case of knowledge and not a case of belief.
2 Recent textbooks and review articles that summarize the literature in this way include, for example, Audi 1998; Steup 2001 Steup /2006 Williams 2001; Feldman 2003. 3 Lehrer 1968 appears to be an important exception, but his positive theoretical argument turns on a premise (premise 3 in Section III) that begs the question against the relevant opponents' views; thus, the force of his article, like most others', rests primarily on his ability to undercut his opponents' putative counterexamples (see Annis 1969; Black 1971; Harker 1980 ).
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The best known putative counterexample to the view that knowledge entails belief is due to Colin Radford (1966) . 4 Radford presents a scenario in which a student named Jean feels quite certain that he does not know any English history. But when Jean is asked to provide dates for certain events in English history, such as the death of Queen Elizabeth, he correctly answers most of the questions. This surprises Jean, and Jean concludes that he does actually know some English history. Radford finds it plausible to regard this as a case of knowledge without belief:
Jean knew that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 but he did not believe that she died in 1603.
The standard response to Radford's example is to deny that the case of Jean is a clear case of knowledge without belief (e.g., Lehrer 1968; Armstrong 1969 Armstrong , 1973 Radford's case (1969, p. 35-36) .
To this objection, Radford replies that "perhaps it is a clear case" (1988, p. 499, emphasis in original) . 4 Others who deny that propositional knowledge entails belief include Woozley 1953; Black 1971; Margolis 1972; Annis 1977; Ring 1977; Harker 1980; Lewis 1996 (in We designed four scenarios that we regard as plausible cases of knowledge without belief, and we presented these scenarios to students at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
The scenarios appear verbatim below. To be clear: We don't expect that most readers of this article will share our judgments about these scenarios. The scenarios are not intended to be compelling to philosophers trained in -warped by? -the mainstream tradition in analytic epistemology. We suspected, however, that ordinary English-speaking undergraduates would, like us, tend to attribute knowledge but not belief.
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Each student received just one scenario, with just one question at the end of it, asking whether the protagonist knows, or alternatively believes, the proposition in question. The only difference between the belief and knowledge scenarios was the substitution of "believe" for "know" in the prompt question at the end of each scenario. Each version of each scenario was given to exactly thirty participants.
( 1. Juliet is a university professor. Unfortunately, she is also prejudiced against student athletes. In her classes, she calls more often on non-athletes than athletes, and she interprets the comments of the former more charitably. When two soccer players, Brett and Bernard, come to visit her in office hours, she treats them patronizingly, explaining the basic concepts of the course in a very rudimentary manner, failing to recognize the sophistication and intelligence behind their questions. They leave, and shortly after, two students with no involvement in school sports enter. Juliet immediately launches into a high-level discussion, generously assuming the students' command of the elementary material. When
Bernard writes the best essay in the course, revealing the intelligence that a neutral observer would have recognized in his previous remarks, Juliet is surprised. All of this is typical of her.
However, Juliet also repudiates all forms of prejudice. She openly affirms that students involved in athletics are just as capable as non-athletes. In fact, she has it on excellent authority that this is the case: Her chair just completed a study showing that the two groups perform equally well in their philosophy classes.
Intrigued by this study, Juliet even reviews her own records and finds that, on average, the athletic students had actually performed better than the other students. But, in spite of all this, Juliet's prejudice remains. She continues to treat her athletic students as if they are less intelligent than her other students.
Does Juliet know that her athletic students are as capable as her other students? yes no (circle one)
(4.) The freaked-out movie-watcher:
Susan loves to watch old horror films. She finally convinces her friend Jamie to watch one with her. It's an old horror film that Susan actually considers to be quite funny, due to its unrealistic plot. The film begins with a group of astronauts who discover alien life on another planet. The aliens look somewhat like bumblebees, but they are dark-green and about two feet in length. The astronauts capture one of these creatures and bring it back to Earth. Once they have it on Earth, it manages to escape and starts laying numerous eggs. The eggs need water to hatch, so the creature lays the eggs in sink faucets. Thus, whenever people turn on their sink faucet, hundreds of newly hatched alien creatures fly out and begin to attack them.
During one of these attack scenes, Susan notices that Jamie is a bit tense. On the way out, Susan stops. "Hold on for a second. I'm thirsty. Let me grab a glass of water." Susan walks over and begins to turn on the sink faucet.
Suddenly, Jamie shouts, "No! Don't do it!" The words come out of Jamie's mouth before she even has time to consider what she's saying. Jamie then looks over and sees that it's only water coming out of the faucet.
Did Jamie know that only water would come out of the sink faucet? yes no (circle one)
We also created two control scenarios -one which we judged to be a clear case of both belief and knowledge (a man watches a tree fall over in his back yard, and participants were asked whether the man knows/believes that the tree fell over) and one which we judged to be a clear case of neither belief nor knowledge (a woman is about to receive a $20 late charge for a bill after her payment was lost in the mail, and participants were asked whether the woman knows/believes that she will be receiving this late charge). As another control condition, we created a false-P version of the unconfident examinee scenario (Kate writes "1613" instead of "1603"). Since "think" is often used in ordinary English to ascribe what philosophers would call beliefs, we also asked "think" versions of each of the four main scenarios -identical to the above scenarios except that "think" replaced "know" in the prompt question. [ ] No, someone cannot know that something is true without believing that it is true.
The remaining twenty participants received essentially the same abstract question but with the order of the philosophical positions reversed (beginning "Some philosophers have argued that it is possible to know that something is true without believing that it is true").
The exact wording of all materials is available online at http://faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/KB.htm.
Results.
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Results for the four main scenarios were similar (within statistical chance) and so they are merged for analysis. Of the 120 respondents who received "know" versions of those scenarios, 90 (75%) answered "yes" the subject does know. But of the 120 respondents who received "believe" versions of those scenarios, only 42 (35%) answered "yes" the subject does believe.
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These percentages are statistically significantly different both from each other and, in both cases, from 50%. 7 Thus, as predicted, a majority of respondents attributed knowledge in these scenarios, while only a minority attributed belief. Figure 1 displays In the yes-yes control condition, 27/30 (90%) of participants answered "yes" to the knowledge question and 27/30 (90%) of participants answered "yes" to the belief question. In the no-no control condition, 4/30 (13%) answered "yes" to the knowledge question and 0/30 (0%) answered "yes" to the belief question (not a statistically significant difference 8 ).
Participants were marginally more likely to answer "yes" to the yes-control knowledge question (90%) than to the knowledge question about the four main scenarios (75%), and they were significantly less likely to answer "yes" to the no-control belief question (0%) than to the belief question about the four main scenarios (35%).
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For three of the scenarios, the proportion answering "yes" to the "think" question (39%) was similar to the proportion answering "yes" to the "believe" question in the four main scenarios; but for the unconfident examinee, the proportion answering "yes" (77%) was more similar to the proportion answering "yes" to the "know" question in the four main scenarios. 10 In the false-P unconfident examinee scenario, 27% of participants attributed belief, approximately the same percentage as attributed belief in the true-P version of that scenario. 11 On the abstract 8 Fisher's exact test, two-tailed, p = .11. 9 Fisher's exact tests, two-tailed, p = .09 and p < .001 respectively.
10 Unconfident examinee 23/30 think; absent-minded driver 13/30; prejudiced professor 8/30; freaked-out movie-watcher 14/30 (χ 2 including all four, p = .001; χ 2 excluding unconfident examinee, p = .24). One possibility is that in the unconfident examinee scenario participants do not interpret "think" to mean "believe", but rather something closer to "guess".
11 Fisher's exact test, two-tailed, 8/30 false-P believe vs. 11/30 true-P believe, p = .58; vs.
26/30 true-P know, p < .001.
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The pattern of results thus confirmed our expectations: A majority of respondents ascribed knowledge in our four main scenarios, but only a minority ascribed belief. We do not assert that a majority of respondents have intuitions in conformity with our view that knowledge does not entail belief, but only that a substantial proportion do, perhaps about half: In the abstract, opinion on the question was divided evenly, and the pattern of responses to the individual scenarios is also consistent with divided opinion on the issue.
The control questions speak against various possible competing interpretations of the main results. The near-ceiling and near-floor responding on the yes-yes and no-no scenarios suggests that participants are willing to endorse "yes" or "no" to either question when the scenario clearly calls for it. The similar pattern of response to the "think" versions (except in the case of the unconfident examinee) suggests that the overall results are not best explained by ordinary speakers using the term "believe" in a special way that is in tension with the more commonly used term "think". The results of the yes-yes control and false-P control suggest that the pattern of responding on the main questions is not best explained by a pragmatically-driven unwillingness to ascribe belief when knowledge is also present.
The Capacity-Tendency Account.
Proponents of the traditional view may wonder what an account of knowledge that doesn't require belief might look like. One potential attraction of the traditional view -that knowledge entails belief -is that its hypothesis about the relationship between knowledge and The problem is that philosophers who have attacked the entailment thesis have not offered an account of the relation of knowledge and belief which would explain our basic reaction. Well-entrenched tenets, be they scientific or not, are rarely rejected, even if they involve persistent anomalies, unless there is a competing alternative to fill the void (1977, p. 217) .
Therefore, we think it worthwhile to briefly consider one alternative approach, which we call the capacity-tendency account. Gilbert Ryle summarizes the view in The Concept of Mind:
Epistemologists are apt to perplex themselves and their readers over the distinction between knowledge and belief.... Part of this embarrassment is due to their supposing that "know" and "believe" signify occurrences, but even when it is seen that both are dispositional verbs, it has still to be seen that they are dispositional verbs of quite disparate types. "Know" is a capacity verb, and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for signifying that the person described can bring things off, or get things right. "Believe", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and one which does not connote that anything is brought off or got right (1949, p. 133-134 Juliet has the capacity to act on her well-grounded information that her student athletes are equally capable even if she lacks the tendency to act on that information; Ben has the capacity to recall the bridge's closure even if he tends to forget about the closure; similarly for Kate and Jamie, although the lack of the tendency in their cases may be fairly short-lived.
We suggest that in the four cases at hand (at least if they are fleshed out in intuitively plausible ways: e.g., with the assumption that Kate answered "1603" due to the right kind of trace from earlier learning) the relevant capacity, whatever it is, is clearly present and thus, on the capacity-tendency view, they qualify as clear cases of knowledge. Whether the relevant tendency is also present is less clear -the subjects' dispositions are divided; the cases might best be regarded as vague or "in-between" cases on a dispositional approach to belief (Schwitzgebel 2001 , 2002 , forthcoming, see also Price 1969 . One can't have a capacity to succeed, it seems, without at least a bit of the corresponding dispositional tendency to succeed. If our central four cases are clear instances of knowledge and vague instances of belief, that would harmonize nicely with one aspect of our empirical results: The percentage of subjects attributing knowledge in the four main scenarios was not too far from the percent attributing knowledge in the yes-yes control scenario (75% vs. 90%), while there was a larger and more statistically significant gap between the percent attributing belief in the four main scenarios and the percent attributing belief in the no-no control scenario (35% vs. 0%). 
